Are Educated Societies Less Violent? Education, Deprivation and Crime in Minas Gerais by Frédéric PUECH
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.02
Document de travail de la série
Etudes et Documents
E 2004.02
ARE EDUCATED SOCIETIES LESS VIOLENT? EDUCATION,





1CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.02
1 Introduction
In 2001, Brazil experienced homicide rate of 23 per 100,000 inhabitants (Interpol, 2002) and
robbery rate of 395 per 100,000 inhabitants (Ministerio da Justiça, 2002). These rates are very
high compared to neighbor countries (respectively 8 and 135 for Argentina, 8 and 279 for Uruguay
in 2001), to Western Europe (respectively 4 and 229 for France, 3 and 69 for Germany) and even
to United States (respectively 5.5 and 148.5). As a consequence, according to Bourguignon
(2000) and Pradhan and Ravallion (2003), safety has become one of main public and private
concern in Brazil and Latin America over the past 20 years.
Determinants of crime have raised interest of social scientists, and particularly of economists
and sociologists. Economists rely hugely on the theoretical framework of individual behavior
developed by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973), considering criminals as “normal” individuals,
responding to incentives and trying to maximize their expected utility following a trade-oﬀ
between legal market activities and illegal sector. Sociological theory, following in Merton’s
wake (1968), consider for its part crime and violence as a deviant behavior coming from the
inadequacy between individual and society. An extension of this theory is to consider crime
as a response to relative deprivation (Kawachi, Kennedy and Wilkinson, 1999). Surprisingly,
there are few recent works trying to relate education to crime, the most signiﬁcant being that of
Usher (1997), who studies the deterrent impact of education’s “civic externality” upon crime at
a theoretical level.
The intuition behind this paper is that education has a signiﬁcant role to play in the re-
duction of crime in developing countries. In other words, the fact that universal education is
not completed in developing countries could be one of the reasons of their high crime rates, by
opposition to developed countries where universal education is now the norm, making education
to be probably a poor determinant of crime in these countries. Moreover, this article proposes to
study how education is linked to crime level, both at theoretical and empirical level and, more
precisely, how education and relative deprivation interact to inﬂuence crime.
Theoretically, section 2 of this paper presents an augmented model of criminal behavior,
which relies on a basic Beckerian setting, in which the concept of relative deprivation is intro-
duced. This model allows for the possibility of crime committed without any economic motivation
or, in other words, for “pure” violent crime such as homicide or assault. It is ﬁrst developed at
an individual level and then aggregated in order to be in adequacy with our data. Section 3
discusses the role of education in the model, distinguishing several measures of education and
their expected impact upon property crime on the one hand and interpersonal violence on the
other hand.
Section 4 presents the data and the econometric setting. Crime rates are issued from a newly
used database, which provides quality data at the municipality level for Minas Gerais, one the 26
Brazilian states, located in the Southeastern region (municipality is the smallest administrative
unit in Brazil). Our database is a cross-section of 723 municipalities of Minas Gerais for the year
2000. Though crime data are issued from police records, which are well-known to undermine
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“true” crime levels, this database is, to our knowledge, the one which furnishes the best data
concerning Brazil and the only one of that kind for this country. By the way, the choice of Minas
Gerais has been conditioned by the existence and the availability of this database.
Section 5 presents the main results of econometric estimates of several kind of crime rates,
distinguishing economic and interpersonal violence, with a special look at the impact of education
variables. The main ﬁnding of this paper is that violent economic crime is not inﬂuenced by
education (even indirectly), while basic education (alphabetization, primary schooling) reduces
signiﬁcantly interpersonal violence, not because it raises human capital (and thus reduces the
incentives to commit a crime) but rather because it increases citizenship and social capital.
Section 6 concludes and raises some policy implications.
2 A theoretical model of crime and deprivation
2.1 Theoretical background
2.1.1 The framework of crime economics
According to the economic theory of crime, initiated by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973),
criminals are like other individuals, seeking to maximize their expected utility and responding to
incentives. Crime is seen as a consequence of a rational choice of time allocation between legal and
illegal activities. In other words, each agent compares his expected earnings in legal and illegal
sector, criminals being those for whom the former is less than the latter. This choice is expected
to be hugely inﬂuenced by deterrence, more precisely, by the probability of apprehension and
the size of punishment: the more the deterrence, the less the number of crimes and criminals.
Following economic theory, crime is also induced by income inequality. Crime, and especially
property crime, is seen by the poorest individuals as a way to reduce the income gap with richer
people. However, this point of view is somewhat restrictive since it gives no explanation to crime
such as homicide, assault or rape, which are committed without any economic incentive.
2.1.2 Introducing deprivation in crime models
What is relative deprivation? Relative deprivation is a sociological concept, more and
more used by economists, mainly to explain migration. Stark (1991) and Yitzhaki (1979) both
use the same deﬁnition of relative deprivation :
We can roughly say that [a person] is relatively deprived of X when (i) he does not
have X, (ii) he sees some other person or persons, which may include himself at some
previous or expected time, as having X (whether or not this is or will be in fact the
case), (iii) he wants X, and (iv) he sees it as feasible that he should have X.
There are two components in the concept; not having X and wanting it causes deprivation,
while conditions (ii) and (iv) ensure relativity. Poverty and/or low education cause absolute
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deprivation, while income inequality (and maybe education inequality) involves relative depriva-
tion. Response to relative deprivation is the willingness to improve his own position relative to
other people. Stark sees rural-to-urban migration as a response to relative deprivation, higher
wages in urban sector inciting rural people to migrate, in order, not to increase income per se,
but to get a higher social position. It is possible and rather easy to adapt this setting to the
crime decision.
Linking crime to relative deprivation The sociological theory of crime, largely in-
ﬂuenced by Merton (1968), far from considering crime as an individual choice, gives a social
explanation. All individuals in a society are assumed to share common values, particularly
common goals and common “legitimate” ways to reach these goals.
Crime is a way for individuals to “adapt” themselves to the society. Merton distinguishes 5
kinds of individual adaptation: (i) conformism (respect of both social goal and means), (ii) inno-
vation (respect of goals but reject of means), (iii) ritualism (neglect of goals, respect of means),
(iv) evasion (reject of both goals and means) and (v) rebellion (reject of goals and means with
introduction of new social values). Crime takes part of innovation, in the sense that individuals
who commit a crime follow the same goals as the hole society but diﬀer from other individuals in
their respect of rules and norms. Moreover, giving too much importance to the goals can make
individuals ignoring totally the means (and their legitimacy) and lead society to a situation of
anomie (absence of norms). In such a situation, individuals who failed to reach social goals
(which, for Merton, is individual success in a competitive society) are frustrated, all the more
when they face successful people, and get alienated from society. Crime, especially violent crime,
is no more than a response to individual alienation. In other words, individuals are engaged in
interpersonal income comparisons, generating either relative deprivation or satisfaction, depend-
ing on their own social position. According to Merton, crime is a way to improve its own income
and social position.
In this paper, we stay in a Beckerian setting and just add a relative deprivation component.
The traditional economic modeling of crime can be considered as incomplete in the sense that
individuals do not only compare expected earnings in the legal sector and expected returns from
illegal activities, they also compare their own income to that of other people, especially people
around them. The setting developed in this paper makes clearer the expected eﬀect of some key
variables on crime. First, we can consider the traditional economic setting of crime (comparison
between legal and illegal income) as a modeling of the eﬀect of absolute deprivation on crime :
poverty and low education incite concerned individuals to commit crimes, both because expected
legal income is very small and because the psychological cost of punishment is fewer than for
wealthier or more educated ones. Second, we shall add the interpersonal income comparison
element. From this point of view, income inequality is a (even the) key variable. More generally,
relative deprivation can come from other variables than income. Education inequality, or social
gap between literate and illiterate people, are also probably part of the issue.
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2.2 A model of crime decision and relative deprivation
Let us consider the gain from crime for individual i, gi as the diﬀerence between beneﬁts and
costs. Beneﬁts are equal to the loot, li, conditional to the probability of not being apprehended
(1−p). Costs of committing a crime are composed by direct cost of oﬀense, ci and the expected
punishment conditional to the probability of being apprehended, p ∗ f:
gi = [(1 − p) ∗ li] − [ci + (p ∗ f)] (1)
Moreover, following Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2002), we assume that crime, oi, will
be committed only if the gain, gi, exceeds the moral cost, mi, associated with illegal activities
and the loss induced by the wage the individual could have potentially earned if he had worked
instead of committing a crime. The moral cost is assumed to be measurable and to have a
pecuniary value. Indirect and immaterial cost of crime will be noted ei:
ei = mi + wi (2)
(
oi = 1 when ei ≤ gi
oi = 0 when ei > gi
(3)
Let us then adopt the setting of relative deprivation developed by Stark (1991). Consider a
small community in which each individual compares his income wi with the community’s average
income, ¯ w and assume that the income distribution in this community is uniform. Then people
whose income is less than the average are relatively deprived:
(
di = 1 when wi < e w , e w = ¯ w − q
di ≤ 0 when wi ≥ e w
(4)
where di is relative deprivation and q is a supportable lower bond, i.e. (w − q) is the upper
bond of relative deprivation (individuals with such an income, though less than community’s
average income, do not feel relatively deprived). Notice that di ≤ 0 indicates a relative satisfac-
tion.
We assume that crime will be committed if and only if it enables to compensate this income
gap, i.e if it contributes to reduce relative deprivation. As a consequence, the direct gain from
crime, gi must be higher than the acceptable level of income, e w:
e w ≤ gi (5)
Crime decision depends on two elements, moral stance mi and relative deprivation di, and
on the relative importance of these two elements. Table 1 presents all the possible situations.
There are actually 5 diﬀerent cases.
- Case 1: the gain from crime is less than acceptable wage.
This case is impossible, since crime is a response to relative deprivation and must at least
enables individual to reach the level of income he considers as acceptable.
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Table 1: Crime decision as a function of relative deprivation and moral stance
di = 1 di ≤ 0
ei ≤ e w ei > e w ei ≤ e w ei > e w
mi ≤ 0 mi ≤ 0 mi > 0
gi ≥ ei ei ≤ e w ≤ gi e w < ei ≤ gi ei ≤ e w ≤ gi e w < ei ≤ gi e w < ei ≤ gi
oi = 1 oi = 1 oi = 1 oi = 1 oi = 1
e w ≤ gi < ei e w ≤ gi < ei
gi < ei Impossible Impossible
oi = 0/1 oi = 0/1
gi ≤ 0 Impossible oi = 0
- Case 2: both gain from crime and relative deprivation are negative.
Then oi = 0 since individual has no incitation to commit a crime (no deprivation and no
beneﬁt from crime).
- Case 3: immaterial costs are less than both acceptable income and gain from crime.
Then oi = 1. There will be crime, whatever individual feels relatively deprived or satisﬁed.
The existence of crime without deprivation can be explained by low moral stance, or
even a moral satisfaction to commit a crime. This can be useful to explain crime against
persons like homicide, assault or rape, which don’t have economic causes. Moreover, this
case suggests the existence of an important gap between expected and acceptable income:
crime is a response to relative but also to absolute deprivation (poverty). In other words,
the objective is to improve social position but also to raise income per se.
- Case 4: immaterial costs are greater than acceptable income but less than gain from crime.
Then oi = 1. There can also be crime without relative deprivation, due to low moral stance.
However, in this case, the gap between expected and actual income is not too high: crime
will be committed in order to improve social position but not to raise income per se.
- Case 5: immaterial costs are greater than both acceptable income and gain from crime
Then oi = 0/1. Crime is possible, as long as beneﬁts from crime exceeds relative depriva-
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tion. In other words, crime is limited by moral values. This case can explain occasional
crime.
This setting preserves the ﬁnding of the initial model following which decision of crime
depends on moral stance. But if relative deprivation is too high, individual shall commit a
crime, even if beneﬁts from crime do not compensate moral cost. Moreover, it allows “pure
violence” in the sense that even without deprivation, individuals can commit a crime, provided
that his moral cost is low or even negative (which means a moral beneﬁt from crime), whatever
the gain from crime. Last but not least, this model conditions the decision to commit a crime
to relative deprivation. Excepted the case of low moral values, crime without deprivation is
impossible, making deprivation the actual determinant of crime (instead of an eventual and
subjective measure of moral values).
2.3 An aggregated model of crime
At a society’s level, one needs to distinguish several kinds of crime. In this paper, we will
follow the usual distinction between crime against property (or economic crime) and violent
crime against persons (or interpersonal crime). Economic crime includes robbery, theft, fraud,
burglary, tax evasion, etc.. Interpersonal violence includes homicide, assault, rape, etc.. Since
total oﬀenses in the society is not simply the sum of all individual oﬀenses, and since we don’t
know the functional form of the relation between total oﬀenses and its determinants, the model
stays very general and explains economic crime, Oe, and interpersonal crime, Op, as follows:
Oe = Oe( ¯ w, D, L, ¯ c, ¯ m, p, f)
±, +, +, −, −,−,−
Op = Op( ¯ w, D, ¯ m, p, f)
±, +, −, −,−
(6)
L is what can be named opportunities for criminals, or possible loots, at a social level. It
should raise with urbanization and mean income level. ¯ c is the cost of crime, which would
decrease in urban areas. These two variables are not simple aggregations or means of li and
ci but rather are social values of these variables. Following the same scheme, ¯ m is the moral
stance of society, as long as it is admitted to be measurable and quantiﬁable, but diﬀers from
the mean (or sum) of moral stance of each individual. Since the aim of economic crime is to get
a pecuniary beneﬁt, which is not the case for interpersonal crime, L and ¯ c contribute to explain
the former but not the latter. Mean income, ¯ w has an ambiguous impact upon crime for several
reasons. On the ﬁrst side, a higher mean income leads to biggest opportunities (a higher L)
and can involve a higher relative deprivation (if income is positively correlated to inequality).
But on the other side, the need of violence and of improving income is assumed to be fewer in
a wealthier society.
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3 Discussing the role of education
3.1 Education and economic crime
Let us consider the ﬁrst part of the equation (6) and evaluate the impact of education on
each variable, distinguishing the eﬀect of individual education (alphabetization, level or years
of schooling) from that of society’s education (average years of schooling). On the one hand,
individual education level is crime-enhancing, via higher opportunities (a bigger li or L) and
a lower cost of crime (fewer ci or ¯ c). Like other market activities workers, “skilled” criminals
shall be more eﬃcient than “unskilled” ones. On the second hand, individual education is crime-
reducing since it increases expected legal income (wi), then reduces relative deprivation, and
since it also raises moral stance (a higher mi or ¯ m). Finally, education is ambiguously related
to crime decision. The eﬀect actually depends on the relative skill-intensiveness of legal and
illegal activities. If the legal sector is more skill-intensive than economic crime, then education
is crime-reducing. Inversely, if it is more proﬁtable for an individual to use his skills stealing or
defrauding instead of working, then education is crime-enhancing. It depends also on the kind
of crime: theft and robbery do not necessarily need a high-skill level though evading tax (for
example) does.
The social education level is even more ambiguously related to economic crime. Actually, the
link between social education and relative deprivation is unclear. Probably, raising the average
years of schooling will increase mean income ( ¯ w) since the positive correlation between education
and income is well-accepted. But if it is accompanied with a widening income inequality, the
eﬀect upon relative deprivation, and by the way upon crime, is positive. Moreover, consider, for
example, a policy leading to an increase of income spread over society in a perfectly uniform
way. This kind of policy will have no impact upon relative deprivation (since everyone keeps his
social position unchanged) and upon crime. In other words, an educational policy eﬃcient from
the point of view of crime reduction is a policy that leads to decreasing income inequality and
relative deprivation. In the context of a developing country, this would be alphabetization and
universal basic education policy, since the income and social gap in these countries is essentially
between literate and illiterate population.
3.2 Education and interpersonal violence
The link between individual education and crime against persons is clearer. Since it increases
moral stance, raises legal expected income, and then reduces the gap with acceptable income,
individual education is unambiguously expected to reduce interpersonal violence. Education at a
social level, however, is as ambiguously related to interpersonal crime as it is to economic crime.
One more time, only an educational policy leading to a reduction of inequality can ensure a crime
decrease. However, crime against persons also deals with some psychological roots, some of them
being inﬂuenced by education (like, for example, self-control); moreover, educating people is an
eﬃcient way to keep everyone involved in the society, whatever it induces inequality or not (what
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Usher, 1997, calls education’s “civic externality”). As a consequence, the level of education of a
given society is expected to inﬂuence negatively its level of violence.
4 Econometric setting and the data
In this paper, we focus on crime issue in municipalities of Minas Gerais. It is one of the
26 Brazilian states, located in the Southeastern region, the wealthiest but also the most violent
of Brazil. However, Minas Gerais has crime rates fewer than its neighbors states (particularly
Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo) since a signiﬁcant part of the state is still rural and involved in
agriculture and mining activities.
4.1 Measuring crime
Crime data used in this paper are issued from a database constructed by the Fundação
João Pinheiro and the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais from police data. It contains, for
the 723 municipalities of Minas Gerais1, the number of occurrences and the gross crime rate
per 100,000 inhabitants, for several violent crimes separately and for aggregated violent crimes
against persons and against property. Though it contains annual data from 1986 through 2002,
we use, in this paper, a cross-section of these 723 municipalities for the year 2000 only, because
of the limitation of socio-economic data.
Violent economic crime is measured by an aggregated violent crime rate against property,
which is the sum of robbery, armed robbery and car-stealing. By symmetry, interpersonal crime
is measured by an aggregated violent crime rate against persons, which is the sum of homicide,
tentative of homicide and assault. Finally, we use a violent crime rate, which corresponds to the
sum of aggregated crime rates against property and against persons.
This database has the advantage to give data as disaggregated as possible, municipality being
the smallest administrative unit in Brazil. Moreover, Minas Gerais is the state with the most
municipality over Brazil, a sign of the willingness of decentralization of this state. Finally, it is
considered, both by Brazilian government and by World Bank that “the municipal level is one
of the most eﬀective entry point for crime and violence prevention” (World Bank, 2003). As a
consequence, the new Plano Nacional da Segurança Publica (National Plan for Public Safety)
puts municipalities in charge of the public safety policy.
However, our database uses police data, which are well-known to undermine actual crime rates
since it records only reported crime. As a consequence, results of this paper should be considered
with caution. Moreover, this database has the advantage to be newly used in economics. To the
best of our knowledge, Beato and Reis (1999) are the only authors who already used it2.
1Minas Gerais now has 853 municipalities but the database was constructed when there were only 723, thus
number of oﬀenses and population for the newly created municipalities are added to the municipality they formerly
belong to.
2However, Beato and Reis used data for the year 1991, which was the year of the preceding census.
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4.2 Explanatory variables
The sample is a cross-section of 723 municipalities of Minas Gerais for the year 2000, which
was a census year in Brazil and for which the best socioeconomic data are available at the mu-
nicipality level. During the census, over 25% of households are covered by a huge and detailed
survey, both at household level (about 460,000 households for Minas Gerais in 2000) and individ-
ual level (about 2,000,000 people). Household questionnaire deals with conditions of living and
housing while individuals are questioned about their personal characteristics, such as income, ed-
ucation, migration, job, etc. The survey contains household and individual weights, constructed
in order to extend results to the hole population. All variables used here were constructed by
aggregating weighted observations for each municipality, and then dividing by the municipality’s
population to get averages.
Education variables
There will be 4 regressions for each crime variable used: in the ﬁrst one, there will be no
education variable, in order to emphasize the impact of the introduction of education variables
in the following estimates; in the remaining three regressions, diﬀerent measures of education
are introduced alternatively: average years of schooling, alphabetization rate and, ﬁnally, shares
population with primary, secondary and tertiary education introduced simultaneously. Following
the theoretical model, average years of schooling is expected to have a negative impact on
interpersonal crime rates and an ambiguous impact on property crime. However, this variable is
well-known to measure far more than education per se. It is widely considered as a rather good
proxy of level of development and is highly correlated to income level. As a consequence, other
variables are needed to isolate eﬀect of education per se. The ﬁrst one is the alphabetization rate
(share of people who can read and write), which is expected to be negatively correlated to either
violent crimes against property or persons. Alphabetization rate diﬀers from average years of
schooling in the sense that it does not increase in a linear way along with the length of studies. In
other words, a high average years of schooling can hide disparities in the access to basic education
while alphabetization rate, on the opposite, is a good measure of the eﬀort made by government
to ensure equal access to school for everyone. An alternative way to diﬀerentiate the impact of
the several schooling levels upon crime is to introduce simultaneously the shares of more than
10-years-old population who has respectively a primary, secondary or tertiary education.
Other explanatory variables
Following Fajnzylber et al. (2002) and Lederman, Loayza and Menéndez (2002), income
inequality, level of development and change in economic conditions constitute what can be called
the “core” model. Economic and sociological theories of crime both suggest income inequality
to be crime-enhancing. The Gini coeﬃcient of income, which measures inequality within each
municipality (but not between) is introduced and expected to have a positive impact on crime
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rates. Human Development Indicator (HDI) for each municipality is used as a measure of
development3. This indicator is used in place of income level because of the endogeneity of income
and oﬃcial crime rates emphasized by Soares (2004). However, since Human Development
Indicator, which is partially correlated with income, can also be suspected of endogeneity, we
use its lagged value (actually the 1991 value). We also computed the growth rate of income
between 1991 and 2000. This choice, conditioned by data availability, can also be justiﬁed from
the point of view of our problematic since the 1990’s were featured by a dramatic increase of
crime rates in Minas Gerais.
One must ﬁnally control for several stylized facts concerning crime and demographic and
social conditions. Crime rates are well-known to be higher in urban and high-population-density
areas. For Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999), cities oﬀer higher expected gains and smaller proba-
bilities of apprehension and recognition for criminals. Population density is used in this paper.
Criminals are also well-known to be often young male, especially for violent crimes. This stylized
fact will be controlled for by introducing the fraction of male between 15 and 24 years in the over-
all population. Moreover, sociologists and criminologists have shown that crime is due to family
instability and, particularly, that crime rates are highly correlated to the share of female-headed
households. Since this share is higher in cities and among racial minority, it could explain why
these two variables are correlated to crime. Finally, racial structure of population is generally
expected to inﬂuence crime level. Esteban and Ray (1999) show that social conﬂict can be ex-
plained by individual characteristics and their distribution among society, and that polarization
has a role to play in explaining social unrest. We follow them and construct a racial polarization
index, using the methodology of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2003), between whites, blacks
and halfcastes. Finally, we don’t introduce any variable of police or deterrence because of the
extreme endogeneity of that kind of variable and because we don’t have any satisfying measure
of deterrence. Since the data do not enable us to control for this endogeneity, it is preferable
not to introduce this kind of variable.
4.3 Some descriptive statistics
Tables 5 and 6 of Appendix B give descriptive statistics and correlations between crime
rates and socio-economic variables, respectively. Table 6 conﬁrms some of the intuition of this
paper and shows that violent crime against property and against persons do not follow the same
scheme. Property crimes raise with development (at least reported property crime) but is weakly
correlated to social and demographic conditions. More worrying is its positive linkage with most
of education variables (actually all education variables excepted the share of population with
a primary-schooling level are positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with economic crime). In
other words, economic crime rates are higher in educated municipalities, which is not really
surprising if we consider education as part of development. In the same time, economic crime
3This indicator has been computed by UNDP, IPEA and FJP in an Atlas of Human Development in Brazil
available for download at: www.undp.org.br
11CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.02
is negatively linked with income growth, which means that the level of income and development
is just part of the issue. It seems actually that, violent economic crime is structurally higher
in richer municipalities (if we turn back to the theoretical model, it just means that loots and
opportunities are higher) but is negatively inﬂuenced by a good economic conjuncture (or a
higher expected legal income in the theoretical model).
On the other hand, Table 6 shows that interpersonal violence is less inﬂuenced by economic
conditions than property crime but is signiﬁcantly dependent from social and demographic con-
ditions, and particularly the population structure in terms of age, sex and race. But the most
important, and the main diﬀerence between interpersonal and economic crime, is the signiﬁ-
cantly negative correlation between each education variable and crime against persons. The
negative impact of alphabetization and primary education is particularly signiﬁcant, which sug-
gests that municipalities with a high share of their population beneﬁting from basic education
are the safest. Moreover, the level of development (measured by HDI) seems to be signiﬁcantly
violence-reducing. In other words, there is really a diﬀerent behavior between economic crime
and pure violence, which conﬁrms the need of a theoretical approach that departs from the
Beckerian setting in order to explain the violence phenomena. Finally, Table 6 also shows that
aggregated violent crime is hugely inﬂuenced by economic crime and thus follows roughly the
same scheme.
4.4 Econometric setting
The econometric model used in this paper is the one set in Puech (2004), following Anselin
(2001). Simple OLS estimations are impossible since crime rates are spatially autocorrelated,
which involves biased results. In order to take into account this spatial autocorrelation, the
following model is estimated:
y = ρWy + βX + ǫ (7)
where y is crime rate, X is the matrix of independent variables, β the associated vector of
coeﬃcients, W the spatial weights matrix, ρ the spatial autocorrelation coeﬃcient and ǫ the
error term. In this paper, W is a so-called row-standardized contiguity matrix. In other words,
ρ is the coeﬃcient associated with the eﬀect of mean crime rate of neighbor municipalities upon
the crime rate of each municipality. Estimating such a model requires a special econometric
treatment. As pointed out by Anselin (2001), interdependence generates spatial autocorrelation,
which bias the OLS estimator, and requires Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimations4.
5 Results
Results are presented in separate tables for each crime rates. Tables 2, 3, and 4 present results
concerning economic crime, interpersonal violence and aggregated violent crime respectively. In
4see Anselin (2001) for a discussion on the OLS bias and on the spatial Maximum Likelihood estimator.
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each table, column (1) is an estimate without any education variable, column (2) introduces the
average years of schooling, column (3) replaces it by alphabetization rate and ﬁnally column (4)
introduces simultaneously the share of adult population with a primary, secondary or tertiary
education, respectively.
Table 2 conﬁrms the intuition raised by correlation coeﬃcients of Table 6 and shows that
violent crime against property is strongly enhanced by both the level of development and income
inequality. In the same time, income growth has no signiﬁcant impact upon this kind of violence.
In other words, economic crime are structurally higher in wealthy places, making more and
more social scientists considering it as a counterpart of development. However, if we turn
to Table 3, this statement appears as partially true, since development has no impact upon
interpersonal violence. From tables 2 and 3 jointly, it seems that the main issue concerning
violence is inequality, not development. Gini coeﬃcient of income is strongly crime-enhancing in
both tables, and for each regressions. These results are in adequacy with stylized facts concerning
Brazil as a hole, i.e. one of the most unequal country in the world and for which it is really the
main social issue5.
In this context, education seems to have no signiﬁcant impact upon economic crime, even
through relative deprivation (Gini coeﬃcient). The only signiﬁcant change due to introduction
of education variables in Table 2 is the drop of both coeﬃcient and z-statistics of HDI while
introducing average years of schooling (column (2)). However, this is not surprising since these
two variables seem to suﬀer from multicollinearity. These results are somewhat disappointing if
we consider that the theoretical model did not enable us to emphasize a clear eﬀect of education
upon crime and that we expected regressions to give more informations. It seems really that the
several expected eﬀects of education in the model, namely a criminal skill-enhancing on the one
hand and a legal wage raising on the other hand, erase each other.
However, Table 3 suggests that basic education has a signiﬁcant role to play in making
safer streets. Both alphabetization rate (column (3)) and the share of population with primary
education (column (4)) have a signiﬁcantly negative impact upon interpersonal crime. These
two variables, far from measuring the impact of skills and knowledge, are probably good proxies
of what Usher calls the education’s “civic externality”. In other words, alphabetization and
basic education have a social role to play in the sense that they give some linkage between
persons. Another explanation would be that, via these two variables, we measure indirectly
social capital, whose impact upon violent crime has been emphasized recently by Lederman et
al. (2002). Anyway, universal basic education has to be part of a policy of crime reduction in
Minas Gerais.
Finally, Table 4 presents results for aggregated violent crime. Like economic crime, it is
signiﬁcantly enhanced by both development and income inequality. Moreover, like interper-
sonal violence, it is signiﬁcantly reduced by both alphabetization rate and primary education.
5As an example, in 2000, in Minas Gerais, the richest 10% represented 44% of total income while the poorest
80% represented only 40% (Atlas do Desevenvolvimento Humano no Brasil, 2003).
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However, the introduction of education variables has no signiﬁcant impact upon coeﬃcients of
economic conditions. In other words, education has a direct role to play in the reduction of
crime but has no indirect impact via its linkage with development or inequality. It conﬁrms
that the impact of basic education emphasized in tables 3 and 4 has probably more to do with
citizenship or social capital (whose relationship with economic conditions is unclear) than with
human capital.
6 Conclusion and policy implications
The aim of this paper was to study the link between education and violent crime in the
context of a developing society, the state of Minas Gerais, Brazil, in 2000. With the support
of a simple theoretical model of crime and deprivation and using a database of crime rates at
the municipality level, we explored eﬀects of several education variables on two kinds of violent
crime, economic and interpersonal. Results suggest that these two kinds of crime follow very
diﬀerent schemes. On the ﬁrst hand, property crime is enhanced by development (because of the
increasing opportunities it induces for criminals) and income inequality. Education, whatever it
is measured, has no signiﬁcant impact upon that kind of crime. On the other hand, development
has no signiﬁcant relation with crime against persons, while income inequality increases it and
basic education (alphabetization, primary schooling) appears to be crime-reducing. Finally,
both economic conditions (positively) and basic education (negatively) are signiﬁcantly related
to violence as a hole (without distinction between the kind of violence).
These results raise several policy implications. First, it appears that the reduction of income
inequality is really a crucial issue concerning the improvement of quality of life in Minas Gerais,
and in Brazil as a hole. Safer streets will not exist as long as income and assets distribution is so
unfair. Second, universal basic education has also a role to play in the reduction of violence in
Brazil. More generally, results of this paper suggests that raising citizenship and social capital
(education being only one of the several way to reach this goal) can contribute signiﬁcantly
to reduce violence, and particularly “pure” violence such as homicide or assault. Making basic
education universal is particularly needed if we consider that Brazil suﬀers from an “under-
education” relatively to its income and development level.
Finally, it would be particularly useful to extend this study following several ways. First,
it needs to be applied to several other developing countries, in order to test the strength of
the hypothesis. Second, it would be particularly interesting to distinguish the characteristics of
criminals from those of the rest of the population, in order to deepen the link between education
and crime and to get more precise policy implications. Third, we have to remember that data
used in this paper are oﬃcial statistics of police, well-known to be downward-biased; a nation-
wide or state-wide victimization survey would be welcome in order to compare results presented
using oﬃcial crime rates to those obtained with “true” crime rates.
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Table 2: Education and violent crime against property
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HDI 1991 11.736 8.884 12.708 11.354
(9.25) (3.92) (5.15) (5.41)
Gini coeﬃcient 4.598 4.415 4.520 4.230
(6.79) (6.43) (6.47) (5.80)
Income growth -0.044 -0.142 -0.015 -0.037
(0.21) (0.65) (0.07) (0.17)










Population density 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.38) (1.22) (1.37) (1.20)
Female-headed households 0.020 0.016 0.020 0.009
(0.55) (0.46) (0.56) (0.24)
Male 15-24 years-old 32.487 33.300 32.132 32.282
(4.64) (4.75) (4.56) (4.58)
Racial polarization 0.764 0.682 0.789 0.665
(2.07) (1.83) (2.11) (1.76)
Intercept -12.622 -12.161 -11.425 -11.909
(10.21) (9.57) (3.97) (4.97)
rho (spatial correlation) 0.263 0.265 0.262 0.261
(5.62) (5.67) (5.60) (5.57)
Observations 723 723 723 723
Log likelihood -1297.052 -1295.900 -1296.946 -1295.751
Wald test of rho = 0 31.549 32.202 31.318 31.068
(p − values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LR test of rho = 0 29.716 30.301 29.508 29.287
(p − values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LM test of rho = 0 33.225 33.868 33.071 32.830
(p − values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
Crime rate and education variables are expressed in logarithms.
15CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2004.02
Table 3: Education and violent crime against persons
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HDI 1991 -2.139 -1.830 3.015 2.102
(1.83) (0.87) (1.32) (1.09)
Gini coeﬃcient 3.668 3.689 3.263 2.464
(5.71) (5.64) (4.95) (3.63)
Income growth -0.052 -0.041 0.102 0.203
(0.26) (0.20) (0.50) (1.00)
Population density 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.19) (1.20) (1.16) (0.49)










Female-headed households 0.042 0.042 0.044 0.014
(1.24) (1.25) (1.30) (0.41)
Male 15-24 years-old 24.856 24.775 23.154 22.398
(3.73) (3.71) (3.47) (3.40)
Racial polarization 1.302 1.312 1.460 1.342
(3.66) (3.64) (4.06) (3.76)
Intercept -2.399 -2.447 4.115 -7.531
(2.05) (2.04) (1.50) (3.39)
rho (spatial correlation) 0.204 0.203 0.188 0.170
(3.81) (3.78) (3.48) (3.16)
Observations 723 723 723 723
Log likelihood -1255.378 -1255.363 -1251.960 -1241.3647
Wald test of rho = 0 14.499 14.318 12.117 9.987
(p − values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
LR test of rho = 0 13.924 13.752 11.694 9.690
(p − values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
LM test of rho = 0 14.556 14.301 12.097 10.034
(p − values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
Crime rate and education variables are expressed in logarithms.
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Table 4: Education and violent crime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HDI 1991 3.346 3.133 7.393 6.710
(3.25) (1.65) (3.59) (3.88)
Gini coeﬃcient 3.414 3.400 3.092 2.394
(5.95) (5.83) (5.24) (3.93)
Income growth -0.130 -0.137 -0.013 0.065
(0.73) (0.74) (0.07) (0.36)
Population density 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.98) (1.96) (1.97) (1.36)










Female-headed households 0.050 0.050 0.051 0.026
(1.66) (1.65) (1.71) (0.85)
Male 15-24 years-old 25.538 25.592 24.183 23.503
(4.28) (4.28) (4.05) (3.98)
Racial polarization 1.062 1.055 1.180 1.066
(3.34) (3.28) (3.67) (3.33)
Intercept -5.280 -5.247 -0.261 -9.186
(5.08) (4.91) (0.11) (4.60)
rho (spatial correlation) 0.281 0.281 0.270 0.257
(5.70) (5.69) (5.45) (5.20)
Observations 723 723 723 723
Log likelihood -1177.759 -1177.750 -1175.198 -1166.093
Wald test of rho = 0 32.517 32.423 29.737 27.052
(p − values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LR test of rho = 0 30.368 30.271 27.899 25.516
(p − values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LM test of rho = 0 33.929 33.566 30.837 28.068
(p − values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
Crime rate and education variables are expressed in logarithms.
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Appendix A: Aggregating relative deprivation
If we consider a general case in which individuals compare their own income not only with




[1 − F(x)]dx (8)
where wh is the highest income known and F(.) is the cumulative distribution of income
among society.




[1 − F(x)]dx (9)
This induces:
D(w) + S(w) =   (10)
where   is mean income. As a consequence, according to Yitzhaki (1979), it is equivalent
to work on S(w) or on D(w), as they are complements to   . Yitzhaki also shows that, by
integrating, we get:
S(w) = w[1 − F(w)] +  φ(w) (11)
where φ(w) is the value of the Lorenz curve at w, i.e. the proportion of total income received
by those whose income is less than or equal to w.
By aggregating at the society level, we get :
S =  (1 − G) (12)
where G is the Gini coeﬃcient. Total relative deprivation can then be written as follows:
D =  .G (13)
In other words, the theory of relative deprivation can be related to a “tangible” variable, the
Gini coeﬃcient. This result shall be useful when running econometric estimates of the model
because, by using the Gini coeﬃcient, the “true” measure of the theoretical concept of relative
deprivation will be used.
6This appendix is inspired from Yitzhaki (1979).
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Appendix B: Descriptive statistics and correlations
Table 5: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Crime against property (/100,000) 723 49.207 94.920 0.000 1118.805
Crime against persons (/100,000) 723 41.152 36.657 0.000 349.284
Violent crime (/100,000) 723 90.282 108.961 0.000 1244.501
HDI 1991 723 0.644 0.058 0.483 0.791
Gini coeﬃcient 723 0.688 0.090 0.500 0.841
Income growth 723 0.512 0.266 -0.330 1.972
Average years of schooling 723 4.118 0.696 2.417 6.731
Alphabetization rate 723 75.672 10.037 40.126 92.879
Primary education 723 0.599 0.043 0.438 0.705
Secondary education 723 0.108 0.035 0.027 0.235
Tertiary education 723 0.023 0.016 0.000 0.123
Population density 723 57.319 289.88 1.430 6744.580
Female-headed households 723 5.298 1.701 1.980 15.440
Male 15-24 years old 723 0.099 0.009 0.068 0.135
Racial polarization 723 0.779 0.166 0.053 0.980
Table 6: Correlation between crime rates and socio-economic variables
Violent crime Violent crime Violent crime
against property against persons
Violent crime against property
Violent crime against persons 0.2177
Violent crime 0.9435 0.5248
HDI 1991 0.3687 -0.2300 0.2463
Gini coeﬃcient 0.3480 0.1206 0.3438
Income growth -0.1075 -0.0503 -0.1158
Average years of schooling 0.4056 -0.1634 0.2997
Alphabetization rate 0.3157 -0.2573 0.1902
Primary education -0.1304 -0.3639 -0.2366
Secondary education 0.4180 -0.0377 0.3540
Tertiary education 0.3588 -0.1441 0.2644
Population density 0.6405 0.1286 0.6012
Female-headed households 0.0366 0.2528 0.1175
Male 15-24 years-old 0.0541 0.2557 0.1316
Racial polarization 0.1086 0.2923 0.1920
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